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This study investigates the relationships between industry-specific institutions, industry
structure, and industry performance. The Norwegian Pelagic value chain’s harvesting
industry and its processing industry comprised the empirical context. The study
findings reveal that the harvesters (the fishers), on average, achieved nearly twice
the return on assets relative to the processors. Furthermore, the fishers’ cash flow
margin was, on average, more than eight times higher, and their annual growth rate
was approximately 70% above the corresponding figures of the processing industry.
This study argues that the two industries’ performance differences are related to the
variations in their institutional setups. The processing industry is subject to the general
Norwegian business environment, whereas the fish harvesting industry benefits from a
sector-specific framework that supports its relative competitiveness. The fishers have
collectively established a legally supported sales organization, thereby strengthening
their bargaining power, vis-à-vis the processors (buyers). The fishers’ rivalry is curbed
by catch share regulations, and incumbent fishers are protected from intruders through
entry barriers, for example, license requirements. Moreover, the processing industry’s
potential threat to vertically integrate upstream into the fish harvesting industry is blocked
through legislation. Finally, in contrast to the processing industry, the fish input cost is
free for the harvesting industry. This study concludes that the fish harvesting industry
has gained a sustained competitive advantage over the processing industry, based on
a more supportive industry-specific institutional framework.
Keywords: fisheries industries, competitive advantage, industry-specific institutions, bargaining power,
competitive forces, seafood value chain
INTRODUCTION
Institutional force being consistent across industries is an implicit premise in the business strategy
literature (Elango and Dhandapani, 2020); institutions are thus commonly defined as a nation-level
construct. This premise could also be valid for most industries in a seafood value chain, such as
fish processing and fish exporting, as these industries are typically exposed to a free market-based
institutional framework. However, the primary production, that is, the fish harvesting industry, is
subject to a sector-specific institutional framework that is implemented to avoid overfishing and
protect the fishers from a devastating internal rivalry (Birkenbach et al., 2017). This study examines
whether industry-specific institutions have the potential to impact and cement profits in a specific
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part of a value chain. Therefore, this study defines institutions
as an industry-level construct. The standpoint that industry-
specific variations in institutional setups can impact industry
performance has attracted scant attention from institutional
scholars (Elango and Dhandapani, 2020). Thus, this study
contributes to the broader discourse on the relationship between
institutional contingencies, industry structure and dynamics,
and industry outcomes (e.g., North, 1990; Peng, 2002; Porter,
2008; Peng et al., 2009; Chacar et al., 2010; Manikandan and
Ramachandran, 2015).
This study argues, along with Peng et al. (2009), that
institutions have the potential to shape the competitive forces
both in and between industries and shift the power balance
and profits among various industries in the same value chain.
Thus, this study suggests that a fish harvesting industry embraced
by a supportive sector-specific institutional framework will
perform better than the related industries in the same value
chain that are subject only to a generally free competition-
based institutional framework. This study therefore empirically
investigates whether different industries that are part of the
same seafood value chain but enclosed by various institutional
frameworks perform differently over time. Thus, the existence
of an industry-specific institutional framework is a significant
independent variable in the study.
The Norwegian pelagic value chain is the selected empirical
context, particularly the harvesting and the processing industries.
This context is particularly suitable to study the performance
differences between vertical links in a value chain, as the fish
processing industry cannot legally integrate upstream toward
the harvesting industry (Isaksen, 2007). Thus, fishers and fish
buyers operate separately and interact through an auction-
based marketplace (Sogn-Grundvåg et al., 2019). The profound
differences in institutional frameworks that embrace the
harvesting industry on the one hand and the more free market-
organized processing industry on the other hand motivated this
study to pay attention to institutional differences when explaining
performance variations between the two industries.
Scholars have recently sought more studies on the impact
of institutions on industry performance in the strategic
management literature (Peng et al., 2018; Elango and
Dhandapani, 2020), as there is a remarkable consensus that
institutions matter (North, 1990; Peng, 2002; Peng et al.,
2008, 2009). This study however tackles the harder and more
interesting issues related to what extent institutions matter
and how they matter. Accordingly, this study integrates
Porter’s (1980) industry viewpoint on strategy and Peng et al.’s
(2009) institution-based perspective to gain a more holistic
understanding of the relationships between industry-specific
institutions, industry structures, and subsequent performance.
This integrative approach allows the theoretical discussion to
advance toward a more holistic model of industry dynamics and
economic outcomes between related industries in a value chain.
Thus, this study bring industry-specific institutions to the
forefront of the strategy literature research agenda. Rather than
considering institutional variety as a national phenomenon,
the study demonstrates how institutional diversity also can
be included at the industry level. In doing so, the empirical
findings of the study showed that the “profit pool” (i.e., the
industry with the better profit) is cemented in the harvesting
industry in the value chain studied. The understanding of how
institutions have locked-in profits in a specific industry in a
value chain by influencing its competitive forces is considered
a significant theoretical contribution of the study. Insights into
institutional contingency effects remain rare in the literature,
although they are a potent source of future theory building
(Elango and Dhandapani, 2020). The study furthermore follows
Porter’s (2008) advice to systematically examine the antecedents
to an industry’s competitiveness.
This study is further organized in the following order. Section
“Theory and Hypothesis” reviews the theoretical framework
of the study. Section “Institutional evolution” outlines the
emergence of sector-specific institutions in the Norwegian pelagic
harveting industry. Section “Material and Methods” describes
the materials and methods. Section “Results” presents the
results, section “Discussion” discusses the findings and their
implications, while section “Conclusion” concludes the study.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
Although neoclassical economic theory predicts that competition
allocates resources to the most profitable industries to achieve
the highest returns, some industries are nevertheless more
attractive than others. Rumelt (1991) argued that unequal returns
over time mark the presence of barriers to resource flows
between industries. The study of such barriers is a principal
concern of industrial organization research when examining the
structure of industries and markets. The industrial organization
field extends the perfectly competitive neoclassical model by
including transaction costs, limited information, and barriers
to entry of new firms, all of which may be associated with
imperfect competition (Williamson, 1991). Porter (1980, 2008)
advanced the field of industrial economics when presenting
his five forces framework to analyze the competitive dynamics
of an industry and suggested that industry structure primarily
determines the mid- and long-term profit potentials of an
industry. The structure manifests itself through the existence
and strength of each of five competitive forces: rivalry among
competitors, bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power
of buyers, the threat of entry, and the threat of substitutes.
He further argued that industry structure strongly influences
how much profit is retained by a firm in an industry
compared with that bargained away by its customers and
suppliers, limited by substitutes, or constrained by potential
new entrants. Porter’s primary focus is thus the relationship
between industry structure and performance. However, this
research stream is criticized for ignoring the context, history, and
influence of institutions on performance (Narayanan and Fahey,
2005). Instead, a free market-based institutional framework is
taken for granted. Laws and regulations are only regarded
as “background,” as they are expected to be common to
most industries.
The Nobel Prize-winning economic historian North (1990)
criticizes both neoclassical and industrial economists for
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neglecting the importance of institutions when explaining long-
term economic performance. He argued that institutions have
the potential to significantly affect the performance of industries
over time. For example, some resource-based industries develop
institutions that stimulate growth and wealth creation for the
stakeholders, whereas others do the opposite. North (1990), a
representative of the new institutional economics perspective,
defines institutions as “the rules of the game in society” or
more formally “the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction” (p. 3). Institutions represent the incentive
structure in an economy, and organizations, such as commercial
fishing vessels, will strive to exploit opportunities within their
given institutional framework. Thus, institutions “matter.” He
further argued that path dependence is key to understanding
long-term economic performance. Path dependence results from
increasing returns mechanisms that reinforce the direction of
a given economic path of development. A path can be altered
not only from decline to stagnation and growth (or vice versa)
from intended institutional changes but also from unanticipated
consequences of fishery policy choices and from external shocks
such as a sudden drop in stock abundance.
Building on the new institutional economics perspective,
the emerging institution-based viewpoint of strategy argues
that besides industry- and firm-level conditions, strategists and
policymakers should consider the impacts of institutions when
aspiring to understand performance differences between nations,
industries, and firms. The theoretical argument of this study,
illustrated in Figure 1, integrates the institution-based viewpoint
of strategy (Peng, 2002; Peng et al., 2009) and the industry-
based viewpoint of strategy (Porter, 1980, 2008) to explain long-
term performance differences between industries in the same
seafood value chain.
The framework in Figure 1 indicates relationships between
an industry’s institutional framework, its structure, and its
performance. If the institutional frameworks between the fish
harvesting and the fish processing industries are significantly
different, this aspect is expected to influence the competitive
forces within these industries and shape their structures and
performance potentials. Institutions thus have the potential to
shift the power balance and profits between various industries
in the same value chain. The fish harvesting industry, which is
embraced by a package of supportive sector-specific institutions
(see Table 1), will expectedly perform better than related
industries in the value chain that are subject to a generally
free competition-based institutional framework. Accordingly, the
following hypothesis is posited in the present study:
H1: An industry with a specific and supportive institutional
framework can gain an institution-based competitive
advantage relative to other industries in the same value
chain.
Porter (1980, 2008) argued that to understand the influences
of institutions on an industry’s structure, one must analyze how
specific government policies affect the competitive forces within
the industry. For instance, license requirements raise barriers
to entry a fishery and increase the incumbents’ profit potential
(Bertheussen et al., 2021). Furthermore, government policies
favoring a cooperative fisher-owned sales union will empower the
fish harvesting industry and influence its performance relative
to the fish processing industry (Jentoft and Finstad, 2018). Fish
quotas that provide an institutional protection of the raw material
market share of the fishers will lead to a less intense rivalry in this
industry (Birkenbach et al., 2017).
Table 1 provides an overview of sector-specific institutions
expected to impact the structure and competitiveness of the
Norwegian pelagic fish harvesting industry.
INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
This section describes the evolution of the industry-specific
institutions outlined in Table 1.
Closing of the Fishery and Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) Regulations
Building up catch capacity in the form of larger vessels and
engines and more efficient fishing technology, such as echo
sounders, power blocks, and purse seines, made the pelagic
fishing fleet highly efficient (e.g., Bertheussen, 2021). In the
1960s, fishing access remained free. However, the herring stock
was so overfished that it collapsed around 1970. Consequently,
registration for purse seiners was stopped in 1970, and the fishery
FIGURE 1 | Analytical model and expected empirical findings.
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TABLE 1 | Sector-specific institutions of the fish harvesting industry.




Supply of fish: The supply of fish to the value chain is based
on the biological production of fish. TACs are set by national
governments or through international negotiations for shared
stocks to institutionally protect the supply of fish from
socioeconomic waste (Hardin, 1968).
Closing of a
fishery
Threat of new entrants: In a closed fishery, incumbents are
protected from entrants by substantial legal barriers to entry,




Threat of vertical integration (new entrants): The Participation
Act (1999) states that only active fishers are entitled to own
fishing vessels in Norway. This institutional arrangement
prevents the processing industry from vertical upstream
integration (Isaksen, 2007). Consequently, this industry
cannot secure its supply of raw material using its own fishing
boats. This aspect emancipates the vessels firms from a
potential threat of industry entry and further strengthens the
fishers’ negotiating power compared with that of the buyers
(Jentoft and Finstad, 2018).
Fisher-owned
sales unions
Bargaining power of sellers: In some countries, e.g., Norway,
through collective action, fishers have historically managed to
establish monopoly-like legally supported sales unions to
counter and overcome historically strong buyers in setting the




Bargaining power of suppliers: To avoid a race to fish, TACs
are normally distributed to domestic vessels as catch shares
by national authorities (Birkenbach et al., 2017). Generally,
when quota systems are introduced, vessels that can refer to
a catch history are allocated quotas free of charge (Arnason,
2008). Accordingly, these vessels do not pay for the fish they
catch. In this case, the bargaining power of the fishing
industry in relation to the fish supply is extremely beneficial.
Rivalry among competitors: A catch share system (e.g.,
individual transferable quota shares) provides an institutional
protection of the vessels’ catch shares from their rivals
(Birkenbach et al., 2017). Moreover, it protects the incumbent
vessels from external intruders. Accordingly, the rivalry
between the players is minimal.
This table is inspired by Porter’s (1980, 2008) five forces framework and
Peng et al. (2009).
closed. Moreover, TAC quotas for herring were introduced in
1971, and the capture of Atlantic Scandinavian herring was totally
banned in 1972. Additionally, in 1972, license requirements were
introduced to the herring fishery (Christensen and Hallenstvedt,
2005). The introduction of catch and participation restrictions
to the herring fishery guided a new era of the fisheries.
Henceforth, resource management formed the foundation of
fisheries, not economic or social objectives. Internationally, this
factor was reflected in the establishment of 200-mile economic
zones from 1977, the Convention on the Law of the Sea in
1982, and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
in 1995 (Hallenstvedt and Dørum, d.u.). When the herring
disappeared, the fishers shifted their attention to alternative fish
species, such as blue whiting, capelin, and mackerel. However,
this resulted in the overexploitation of these species, and
hence, the introduction of new and stringent regulations was
imperative (ibid.).
Ownership Restrictions
In the 1930s, a conflict arose between the fishing-owned coastal
fleet and the emerging trawler fleet in the cod fishery. Who
then should be allowed to own a fishing vessel: active fishers
or external investors (Hallenstvedt and Dørum, d.u.)? In 1932,
it was legally decided that only active fishers could obtain a
trawl license. A decade later, the legislation was continued, and
it was decided that only active fishers could own any Norwegian
fishing vessel. The law on property rights to fishing vessels,
the Participation Act, is still regarded by fishers as one of the
mainstays of Norwegian fisheries policy (Jentoft and Finstad,
2018). This law provides active Norwegian fishers with an
exclusive right to catch fish.
Fisher-Owned Sales Unions
In the interwar period, the international economic crisis led
to price pressure on fish, which propagated through the value
chain. The fishers had a weaker bargaining power than the buyers
when they were to sell perishable fish, and they appeared as
financial losers. Consequently, they collectively chose to organize
to establish counterpower (Hersoug et al., 2015; Jentoft and
Finstad, 2018). Thus, the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association
was founded in 1926 as the fishers’ professional organization
and political representative. As a result, the turnover of pelagic
fish was taken over gradually by fisher-owned sales unions.
The firsthand sales of herring was organized through “the
herring sales organization” (Norges Sildesalgslag, originally
“Storsildlaget” in 1927). Their exclusive right to sell herring was
quickly legislated through the Herring Act in 1930 (Christensen
and Hallenstvedt, 2005). This act has granted the fishers an
exclusive right to set a minimum price in the firsthand market
if they could not reach a consensus with the buyers. The act
also prohibited the sale of herring from the fishers to the
processing industry outside the mandated sales organization.
This exclusive right still exists, and the fishers hence succeeded
in establishing a herring sales monopoly (Hersoug et al., 2015;
Jentoft and Finstad, 2018).
Fish auctions bring sellers and buyers together, and various
fish species are generally available in various sizes, quantities, and
qualities. Auctions can reduce transaction costs for sellers and
buyers. They are organized typically by sellers, who aim to benefit
from the competition by extracting the maximum revenue from
buyers (Riley and Samuelson, 1981). Sellers usually decide the
auction method and rules. In the 1970s, the Norwegian pelagic
auction was established. The auction platform is owned and
operated by Norges Sildesalgslag, which is the current sales union
for Norwegian pelagic fishers (Sogn-Grundvåg et al., 2019).
Tradable Catch Shares
Individual non-tradable vessel quotas (IVQs) were introduced in
1978 for purse seiners fishing capelin and extended in the late
1980s to include mackerel and herring (Årland and Bjørndal,
2002). The IVQ system was modified in 1996 under the unit quota
(UQ) scheme, aiming to reduce the number of vessels because the
catch capacity still exceeded the available quota basis (Hersoug,
2005). In 2005, the UQ system was converted into a “structural
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quota” system as an additional measure to reduce catch capacity
and increase efficiency. This system was a more flexible and
market-oriented than the UQ system (Hannesson, 2013).
Norwegian Pelagic Value Chain
The Norwegian pelagic value chain shares the same supply
base with mackerel, herring, capelin, and blue whiting as the
main species caught, processed, and sold. In the pelagic sector,
approximately 80% of the catch is taken by large seagoing vessels.
The coastal fleet is therefore less significant (Asche et al., 2014).
The fishing occurs when the fish quality is good, and the fleet
achieves high catch rates. The quality of pelagic fish is determined
primarily from the fat content of the fish and the presence of
parasites and plankton. These are natural factors, and there are
large quality variations in terms of season, fish species, and catch
area (Sone et al., 2019; Bertheussen et al., 2020a).
The average pelagic production per processing plant was
approximately 15,000 tons in 2012 (Asche et al., 2014). The
onshore facilities compete for the raw material. This aspect has
created overcapacity and plants that outbid each other to obtain
sufficient raw materials (PwC., 2019). Besides overcapacity, the
plants struggle with an uneven supply of raw materials during the
year, as there are large seasonal variations in the pelagic fisheries.
Additionally, TACs change from year to year. At present, the
pelagic processing industry is mostly consolidated (PwC., 2019).
In 2019, approximately 22% of the Norwegian mackerel was
exported directly to quality-conscious Japanese buyers. Thus,
Japan is the best-paying market (Bertheussen et al., 2020a). China
bought around 19% of the mackerel, where the majority of the
fish was further processed and re-exported to Japan. In 2019,
approximately 40% of the Norwegian mackerel exports were sold,
directly or indirectly, to the Japanese market. Other essential
markets were South Korea, Nigeria, and Turkey.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Research Design
This study investigates the long-term relationships between
industry-specific institutions (independent variable), industry
structure (intermediate variable), and industry performance
(dependent variable) (see Figure 1). The Norwegian pelagic value
chain’s harvesting industry was selected as the experimental
group, and the processing industry in the same value chain
was selected as the control group. This context is considered
particularly suitable to study performance differences between
vertical links in a value chain as the fish processing industry
cannot legally integrate upstream toward the harvesting industry
(Isaksen, 2007). The two industries thus operate separately and
have coordinated their exchanges in auctions (Sogn-Grundvåg
et al., 2019). The selected industries therefore only include “pure
players,” that is, they focus on a single value chain activity such as
fish harvesting and fish processing.
Furthermore, the two industries compared are exposed to
the same general business environment because they are located
in the same nation. The industries are also exposed to the
same biological environment, as they are both part of the same
seafood value chain. Thus, the more diverse the institutional
settings, the better the prospect to isolate institutional factors
accountable for performance differences between the selected
industries. The harvesting industry is exposed to significant
institutional influences, which are historically justified and
aimed at contributing to sustainable fisheries (see Table 1 and
section “Institutional Evolution”). The processing industry lacks
corresponding institutional protection mechanisms, although the
postharvest industry also depends on a sustainable harvesting
sector. According to this study, their different institutional
environments set these industries apart. Otherwise, it is argued
that the sectors are comparable. Numerous factors can affect
industry performance in the short term, whereas industry
structure, as manifested by the competitive forces, sets industry
performance in the medium and long terms (Porter, 1980,
2008). This study has consequently selected a relatively long time
horizon of 15 years (2003–2017).
Sampling and Data Collection
The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries (NDF) requires most fish
vessel firms to report income and cost data annually per vessel
(Vassdal and Bertheussen, 2020). This study uses this data set
to gain insights into the profitability development of the pelagic
harvesting industry. The NDF randomly selects a representative
sample of vessels without replacement for its annual profitability
surveys. The number of vessels that participate annually in this
study is listed in the penultimate row in Table 3.
The data source used to analyze the pelagic processing
industry is the annual profitability study of the fish processing
industry conducted by the Norwegian research organization
Nofima (Nyrud and Bendiksen, 2019). Every year, Nofima
surveys profitability and structural changes in the Norwegian
fish processing industry. These profitability analyses are based on
available annual accounts for every company in the processing
industry. However, the Norwegian pelagic processing industry
comprises two segments: the consumer industry and the meal
and oil industry. As most of the herring and mackerel are for
consumption, this study has selected to focus on the pelagic
consumer industry. Pelagic production must generally account
for more than 75% of a firm’s turnover to be included in
this industry segment (Nyrud and Bendiksen, 2019). For a few
large pelagic companies engaged in both types of processing
activities, the revenues, expenses, and investments are distributed
proportionally between the consumer industry and the meal and
oil industry. The number of pelagic processing firms participating
in this study is given in the last row in Table 3.
Data Processing/Calculations
This study examines and explains performance variations
between the Norwegian pelagic value chain’s harvesting and
processing industries (see Figure 1). The research design requires
valid and reliable performance measures at the industry level.
Performance is a multidimensional concept and can be measured
by profitability, growth, or market share. This study applies
multiple performance indicators, as outlined in Table 2. The
primary operationalized dependent variable is the industry’s
return on assets (ROA). ROA includes the industry’s total activity
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TABLE 2 | Performance measures applied in this study.
Return on
assets (ROA)
The industry’s ROA is calculated as net income over total
assets based on book values; thus, ROA = (Net
income/Average total assets) × 100%. This ratio measures how
efficiently an industry can profit from its assets, irrespective of
the size of the assets or resources it owns or controls.
Asset turnover
(ATO)
ATO is calculated as net sales revenue over total assets; thus,
ATO = (Net sales/Average total assets) × 100%. This financial




Operating CFM is calculated as Earnings Before Interest, Taxes,
Depreciations, and Amortizations (EBITDA) over net sales
revenue; thus, CFM = (EBITDA/Net sales) × 100%. CFM thus




Revenue figures reflect both short- and long-term changes in an
industry. CAGR = [(End value/Start value)ˆ1/n] − 1 can be used
as a measure of industry performance based on the assumption
that growth is a precursor to profitability and the achievement of
sustainable competitive advantages (Barney, 1991; Porter,
2008). Another argument to use revenue growth is that the
growth process is driven by the underlying demand for the
industry’s products and services that are regarded as positive.
and enables the comparison of different industries (Magni, 2009;
Penman, 2013). A weakness of this measure is that the wealth
increase that occurred in the harvesting industry as a result of
significant increases in quota prices during the study period
(Flaaten et al., 2017; Hannesson, 2017) is not reflected in ROA
calculations based on book values. If market values of quotas
were used as a basis for the calculations, both the numerator
(through quota revaluations) and the denominator (through
greater quota assets valuation) would be larger, and the net
impact on the ROA ratio would be positive. The book value-
based ratio calculated in this study is therefore conservative
for the harvesting industry. The processing industry has not
benefited from a corresponding increase in the valuation of
intangible quota assets during the study period. In this study,
other performance measures supplement ROA calculations, such
as asset turnover, cash flow margin, and revenue growth.
RESULTS
This section presents the empirical response to HI. The
development of ROA in the industries studied is illustrated and
compared in Figure 2.
As shown in Figure 2, during the 15-year examination, the
harvesting industry performed better in 11 years. In 2014, the
two industries performed equally well, whereas in 3 years (2003,
2008, and 2009), the processing industry performed better. More
key variables that describe the economic performance of the two
industries are outlined in Table 3.
The findings are reported in Table 3. Subpoint a indicates
that the processing industry’s competitive forces are more intense
than those of the harvesting industry, as the economic result of
the processing industry was a moderate average ROA of 4.0%
during the 15-year study. This outcome is in stark contrast to the
average of 7.0% in the harvesting industry, which indicates that
the competitive forces in this industry are more agreeable.
The cash flow margins of the two industries (Table 3b)
are hugely different, as the average is immense at 33.5% for
the harvesting industry and a far more moderate 4% for the
processing industry. This factor illustrates that processing is a
low-margin business, whereas fishing is the opposite. However,
asset turnover (Table 3c) is in favor of the processing industry,
with an average of 179% compared with 20%. Finally, the findings
in Table 3d, which are commented in table note 3, show that
fishers capture the largest part of the industries’ revenue growth
with an annual growth rate of 6.7% compared with 3.9% for
the processing industry. An overall assessment of the results in
Table 3 shows that three out of four performance indicators (3a,
3b, and 3d) favor the harvesting industry. Therefore, the findings
of Table 3 demonstrate that the harvesting industry achieved
profitability superior to that of the processing industry in the
Norwegian pelagic value chain in the period studied.
DISCUSSION
This study examined the relationships between industry-
specific institutional frameworks, industry structures, and the
performances of related industries in a disintegrated seafood
value chain. The fish harvesting industry and the fish processing
industry in the Norwegian pelagic value chain represent the
empirical context. The hypothesis raised in this study was that an
industry with a specific and supportive institutional framework
can gain a sustained institution-based competitive advantage over
other industries in the same value chain. The potential advantage
is expected to materialize in higher profits. The study findings
support the hypothesis, as the harvesting industry achieved a
significant better ROA (p < 0.001) than the processing industry’s
during the study period.
This study further argued that the performance differences
observed can be related to the various industries’ institutional
setups (see Figure 1). By having a more supportive institutional
framework (see Table 1), the harvesting industry in the
Norwegian pelagic value chain has gained an institution-based
competitive advantage manifested as superior performance
compared with the related processing industry (see Table 3). This
study thus supported North’s (1990) statement that “institutions
matter.” This finding is also consistent with the institution-
based viewpoint of strategy and is considered a theoretical
contribution of the present study, as insights into institutional
contingency effects in general and industry-specific institutional
effects in particular remain rare in the literature (Peng et al.,
2009). Both North and Peng underlined the significant role
of institutions in explaining enduring economic performance
variations. However, the results contrast neoclassical economic
theory, which claims that competitive industries can only expect
equal economic returns over time. The findings also contrast the
propositions of industrial economists who regard institutions as
background only for industry competitiveness and performance
(Bain, 1968).
This study demonstrated that in the selected empirical
setting, “institutions matter” and the extent to which they
matter economically for the industries involved. The discussion
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TABLE 3 | Performance differences of the harvesting and processing industries in the Norwegian pelagic value chain in the period 2003–2017a.
3a ROA 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
Harvesting 3.8% 7.2% 9.7% 7.7% 8.1% 7.7% 7.4% 8.3% 11.4% 6.6% 3.5% 3.9% 5.9% 8.0% 5.9% 7.0%
Processing 4.9% 1.8% 6.4% −3.2% 4.3% 9.6% 9.7% 5.5% 4.7% 2.2% 1.8% 3.9% 1.7% 3.6% 3.3% 4.0%
Differenceb −1.1% 5.4% 3.3% 10.9% 3.8% −1.9% −2.3% 2.8% 6.7% 4.4% 1.7% 0.0 4.2% 4.4% 2.6% 3.0%
3b Cash flow margin
Harvesting 25.5% 31.0% 34.7% 32.0% 30.0% 33.6% 33.5% 35.6% 40.0% 34.0% 28.6% 31.6% 34.8% 40.7% 36.5% 33.5%
Processing 4.9% 3.0% 4.5% 0.6% 4.4% 6.5% 6.3% 4.5% 3.7% 3.0% 3.0% 4.2% 2.9% 3.8% 4.5% 4.0%
Differenceb 20.6% 28.0% 30.2% 31.4% 25.6% 27.1% 27.2% 31.1% 36.3% 31.0% 25.6% 27.4% 31.9% 36.9% 32.0% 29.5%
3c Asset turnover
Harvesting 33% 40% 41% 33% 32% 31% 29% 31% 35% 27% 23% 21% 25% 26% 23% 30%
Processing 194% 214% 222% 184% 165% 175% 182% 175% 187% 178% 162% 155% 169% 170% 147% 179%
Differenceb −161% −174% −181% −151% −133% −144% −153% −144% −152% −151% −139% −134% −144% −144% −124% −149%
3d Revenue growth (million NOK) Growthc
Harvesting 11 15 17 18 23 23 19 22 24 20 18 20 25 28 30 29
Processing 3,241 3,130 3,945 3,255 3,870 5,280 5,900 6,068 7,358 7373 6,517 6,879 5,903 6,328 5,782 2,541
Differenceb Revenue differences are not calculated, as they correspond almost to the entire turnover of the processing industry.
Sample S n
Harvesting 171 195 218 185 152 163 136 138 129 132 115 105 103 103 95 2,232
Processing 30 27 30 27 22 23 23 24 19 20 22 17 15 14 12 325
aAll figures are based on weighted averages and expressed in current Norwegian kroner (NOK). As of May 2021, NOK 10 ≈ EUR 1.
bA paired t-test assuming unequal variances showed significant differences between the two groups (p < 0.001).
cThe values represent the absolute growth in revenues from 2003 to 2017 (million NOK). This aspect is equivalent to a mean annual growth rate of 6.7% for the harvesters
and 3.9% for the processors.
now turns to an interesting issue of how they matter.
The argumentation is in line with Porter’s (2008) advice
to systematically examine the antecedents to an industry’s
competitive forces. This aspect is considered another theoretical
contribution of the study.
The aim of introducing TAC regulations (a in Table 1) was
to avoid the overexploitation of fish stocks and secure the entire
value chain’s raw material supply (Birkenbach et al., 2017).
Without TAC regulations, the value chain’s supply of fish will be
at risk. Accordingly, the TAC institution is crucial to the supply of
fish to both the harvesting and processing industries. Thus, TAC
regulations can rarely explain why one specific industry of the
same seafood value chain performs better than the other.
Closing a fishery (b in Table 1) aims to reduce excess
capacity and make the fishery more profitable for the remaining
stakeholders (Hersoug, 2005). Besides, closing a fishery
neutralizes the threat from intruders (Porter, 2008) and prevents
new entrants from obtaining a share of the biological value
creation in captured fisheries. This aspect is beneficial to
incumbent firms (Bertheussen et al., 2021). In the processing
industry, which is subject to Norway’s general institutional
business framework, there is a freedom of establishment.
This industry therefore can face a threat of entry which
is not beneficial.
The Participation Act states that only active fishers are
entitled to own fishing vessels in Norway. This institutional
arrangement prevents the processing industry from vertical
upstream integration (c in Table 1; Isaksen, 2007). Therefore, this
industry cannot secure its supply of raw material using its own
fishing boats because any transaction has to occur through fish
auctions operated on the conditions determined by the fishers
(Sogn-Grundvåg et al., 2019).
Through collective action, the harvesting industry has
managed to establish a monopoly-like cooperative sales union to
counter and overcome historically strong buyers (d in Table 1).
The fishers’ aim was to shift the balance of power and accordingly
the competitive advantage in their favor via institutions (Hersoug
et al., 2015; Jentoft and Finstad, 2018). The processing industry
on the other hand has to compete for fish at fisher-owned
auctions (Sogn-Grundvåg et al., 2019) for each purchase of raw
materials. Vessels that historically were allocated catch shares
for free do not pay for the fish caught. The bargaining power
of the harvesting industry relative to their fish supply is, in this
case, extremely beneficial as the fishers do not have to pay for
its most crucial input (pelagic fish) in contrast to the processing
industry.
In line with a more liberal fisheries policy (Holm and
Henriksen, 2014), the Norwegian authorities introduced catch
shares in the 1990s to protect the fishers’ profitability (subpoint
e in Table 1). Without catch shares, each fisher would race to
maximize his/her share of the TAC (Birkenbach et al., 2017).
However, with an institutional protected catch share (Hannevig
and Bertheussen, 2020), a fisher has nothing to gain by spending
excessive effort to obtain his/her allocated catch. The individual
transferable quota catch share system (i.e., vessel quotas) was
introduced to remove excess capacity and internal rivalry in
the pelagic harvesting industry. In comparison, the processing
industry does not have institutional protection of its raw material
market share, as it operates in a free-market and auction-based
business environment. This study will next turn to discuss
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FIGURE 2 | Return on assets (ROA) of the fish harvesting industry and the fish processing industry of the Norwegian pelagic value chain in the period 2003–2017.
whether the probable institution-based competitive advantage of
the fish harvesting industry has the potential to be sustainable.
Is the Institution-Based Competitive
Advantage of the Harvesting Industry
Sustainable?
The resource-based viewpoint of strategy argues that resources
that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (“VRIN”
resources) can support a firm in gaining a sustained competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991). However, an industry, not a firm, is the
present study’s level of analysis. Nevertheless, several empirical
studies have used a firm perspective at other levels of analysis.
For example, the firm perspective has been used by Hervás-
Oliver and Albors-Garrigós (2007) to study business clusters, and
Lawson (1999) used the firm perspective to conduct regional-
level analysis. Therefore, in this study, the VRIN framework was
applied at an industry level of analysis. When applying VRIN,
an issue is whether the specific institutions of the harvesting
industry (see a–e in Table 1) are VRIN and can thus give rise
to a sustained institution-based competitive advantage of this
industry compared with the related processing industry.
TAC regulations (a in Table 1) are valuable as an institution
to ensure the ecological and economic sustainability of a
commercial fishery (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). However, as
this institution is critical for the value creation of the whole
Norwegian pelagic chain, it cannot give rise to one industry
performing better than the other in the chain. Accordingly,
TAC is supposed to be equally valuable to all industries in a
seafood value chain and not a VRIN resource to any of the
industries involved.
This study however considers the closing of a fishery (b in
Table 1) as a VRIN resource for the harvesting industry, as
it appears as a substantial threat to new entrants. Bertheussen
et al. (2021) found that no new establishments have been set
up in the Norwegian pelagic seagoing harvesting industry in
the past 20 years.
The Participant Act (c in Table 1) aims to protect the
fishers’ established right to harvest fish. This institution affects
the balance of power between the two industries and thereby
their relative competitive position, as the processing industry
is prevented from integrating vertically upstream toward the
harvesters. This aspect is a historically established right of
the fishers, and in Norway, a political earthquake is probably
needed to change this institutional arrangement (Grytås, 2013a).
Accordingly, this right is regarded as a VRIN resource for the
harvesting industry.
The fisher-owned sales union (d in Table 1) appears to have
contributed significantly to a shift of power and profit from the
processing to the harvesting industry. In this way, a specific
sector in a seafood value chain has been able to create institution-
supported bargaining power, which affects the fish prices set
at auctions (Jentoft and Finstad, 2018; Sogn-Grundvåg et al.,
2019). The fact that one industry in a value chain has been
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able to establish itself in the role of price setter instead of price
taker probably has substantial performance implications. The
Norwegian system of mandatory sales unions with monopoly
power protected by law was invented during the economic
crisis in the late 1930s. The unions have since survived and
thrived, even in an era of increased globalization and market
reforms. However, strong forces inside and outside Norway’s
fishing industry aspire to take away the legal right from the
sales unions to determine the minimum prices and the exclusive
ownership that fishers have to these organizations (Grytås,
2013b). Nevertheless, the fisher-owned sales union is regarded as
a VRIN resource for the harvesting industry in this study.
This study also found it unlikely that the catch share
institution (Table 1) will be removed in the foreseeable future.
Catch shares facilitate the neutralization of a destructive rivalry
between the players, which is essential to ensure a sustainable
economy for the fishers (Birkenbach et al., 2017). However, the
political situations may be less liberal in the future and the
extent to which quota trading will be allowed is more uncertain.
Anyhow, several players have invested large amount of money
in quota shares and matching vessel capacity based on a long-
term business perspective (Bertheussen et al., 2020b). These
stakeholders will expectedly use all available resources to oppose
significant changes that underpin their original investment
assumptions. Thus, in this study, the catch share system is
regarded as a VRIN resource for the harvesting industry.
In brief, this study found it reasonable to conclude that
the sector-specific institutions that support and protect the
harvesting industry have proven to be VRIN for several decades.
Such prominent institutions are barriers that hinder intruders
from entering the industry (Bertheussen et al., 2021), catch share
systems that curb rivalry (Birkenbach et al., 2017), and fisher-
owned monopoly-like sales unions that create bargaining power
(Hersoug et al., 2015; Jentoft and Finstad, 2018). Institutional
change typically comprises marginal adjustments (North, 1990).
This study showed that these institutions have helped to make the
harvesting industry more attractive than the rivaling processing
industry over time (see Table 4). The institutions involved show
a significant degree of stability over decades. They have locked
the value chain into a historical path that is hardly subject
to discontinuous change (North, 1990). Therefore, this study
concluded that the harvesting industry has gained a sustained
institution-based competitive advantage over the processing
industry in the Norwegian pelagic value chain.
Management Implications
This study demonstrated that institutions can lead different
industries in the same value chain toward new ways of competing,
which alter the competitive forces for the better for one industry
and for the worse for another. When Norwegian fishers initially
managed to establish a legally supported monopolistic sales
union (Hersoug et al., 2015; Jentoft and Finstad, 2018), the
two industries’ relative bargaining power changed. The sales
union acts as a choke point with immense power because any
fish transactions between fishers and buyers have to pass it.
Extraordinary profit made in a specific industry in the same
value chain often has choke points in the sense that particular
TABLE 4 | Institutions as VRIN resources in a seafood value chain.
Institution Comments
a. TAC regulations Not VRIN resource because it is considered equally
important for all industries in the value chain.
b. Closing of a fishery VRIN resource for the harvesting industry.
c. Participation
restrictions
VRIN resource for the harvesting industry.
d. Legally protected sales
monopoly
VRIN resource for the harvesting industry.
e. Catch share system VRIN resource for the harvesting industry.
This table is inspired by Barney (1991).
business activities control the flow of profits throughout the chain
(Gadiesh and Gilbert, 1998). Choke points therefore have vital
strategic importance. This study illustrated that an industry that
controls a choke point can influence the distribution of profits
among its direct competitors. A strategic issue for a firm is thus
whether the management can focus on the industry with the most
significant profit potential. However, care has to be exercised
here. One aspect is to determine such potential; another is to
be successful in this more attractive industry considering the
capabilities the organization already possesses. However, most
companies are unable to achieve such a dramatic shift in their
value chain positioning, no matter how attractive the profit
concentration is in a related industry, because the entry barriers
are high (Gadiesh and Gilbert, 1998; Bertheussen et al., 2021).
The nature of rivalry in an industry can be altered by mergers
and acquisitions that introduce new capabilities and ways of
competing (Porter, 2008). However, in the pelagic harvesting
industry, strict quota trade restrictions put an effective stop to
how much a fishing vessel firm is allowed to grow (Bertheussen
et al., 2021). Conversely, in the pelagic processing industry,
several significant mergers in recent years have resulted in a
couple of large firms that control most of the sector (Asche et al.,
2014; PwC., 2019). This aspect indicates that the stakeholders
may attempt to realize the supply-side economies of scale.
Supply-side economies of scale deter entry by forcing the eventual
entrants to either enter the industry on a large scale or accept
a cost disadvantage (Porter, 2008). Therefore, the threat of
intruders seems to be minimal for both the harvesting industry
and the related processing industry in the Norwegian pelagic
value chain.
Expanding the entire value chain’s overall profit by raising
the quality of the products sold creates win–win opportunities
for multiple value chain stakeholders (PwC., 2019; Bertheussen
et al., 2020a). However, expanding the pie does not reduce
the industry structure’s importance (Porter, 1980, 2008). How
the expanded pie is divided will ultimately be determined by
competitive forces within and between the industries involved. In
this study, the most successful industry was the one that expanded
the profits made by the value chain in ways that allowed it to share
disproportionately in the benefits.
Policy Implications
Porter (1980, 2008) claimed that industry structure grows out of
a set of economic and technical characteristics that determine
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each competitive force’s strength. However, this study argued that
barriers to entry, rivalry, and the seller and buyer’s bargaining
power can be influenced immensely by the sector-specific
institutional environment of an industry (see Figure 1). The
profitability of a seafood industry is thus, to a large extent, a result
of its institutional design, (Bertheussen and Vassdal, 2021) which
is made up of small and large political decisions over time.
The current institutions of the Norwegian pelagic harvesting
industry (see Table 1) were established to protect the fish
resources against overfishing, curb the rivalry between fishers,
and support their historically weak bargaining power (Hersoug
et al., 2015; Jentoft and Finstad, 2018). Consequently, the
extraordinary profit made (the “profit pool”; see Table 3) has
shifted from the processing industry to the harvesting industry
in the value chain studied. That institutions can move the profit
pool and cement it in a particular part of a (seafood) value chain
is a significant theoretical contribution of this study.
Despite extensive changes in the value chain and its
environment, the fisher-owned sales union and the law that
underpins this institution (the revised Raw Fish Act of 2013)
have managed to appear relevant and legitimate by adapting
continuously (Hersoug et al., 2015). Although this institutional
design is context specific, the legal framework and the cooperative
sales unions can perhaps offer some inspiration for similar
institutional reforms in other parts of the world. This study
demonstrated that the profit pool, through institutions, can be
shifted and anchored to the industry that, in the public interest,
has the greatest need for support.
CONCLUSION
In classic industry analyses, institutions operate at best in the
background (Peng et al., 2009). This study, however, developed
a theoretical model that includes industry-specific institutions as
the independent variable, industry structure as the intermediate
variable, and industry performance as the dependent variable. It
is further hypothesized that an industry with a specific supportive
institutional framework can acquire a sustained institution-based
competitive advantage over other industries in the same value
chain. To test the hypothesis, the study chose the harvesting and
processing industries of the Norwegian pelagic value chain as its
empirical context. The harvesting industry is surrounded by an
industry-specific institutional framework, whereas the processing
industry is exposed only to the general national institutional
setup. Thus, in this study, the harvesting industry was chosen
as the experimental group and the processing industry in the
same value chain as the control group. Moreover, the two
industries compared are disintegrated so that the economic
returns from their respective activities are isolated. This factor
reliably measures and compares the performance of each of the
industries, as they are not involved in mixed business activities.
The findings showed that the harvesters (the fishers), on
average, achieved nearly twice the ROA relative to the processors.
Furthermore, the fishers’ cash flow margin was, on average,
more than eight times higher, and their annual growth rate
was approximately 70% above the corresponding figures of the
processing industry. Based on the relatively long study period
(15 years) and the fairly consistent findings presented, this study
suggested that the better performance of the harvesting industry
compared with the processing industry is related to a more
supportive institutional framework of the former industry. The
fishers have collectively established a legally supported sales
organization, thus strengthening their bargaining power, vis-
à-vis the processors (buyers); the fishers’ rivalry is curbed by
catch share regulations, and incumbent fishers are protected
from intruders through entry barriers, for example, license
requirements. Moreover, the processing industry’s potential
threat to vertically integrate upstream into the harvesting
industry is blocked through legislation. Finally, in contrast to
the processing industry, the fish input cost is free for the
harvesting industry. This study therefore concluded that the best-
performing industry has gained an industry-specific institution-
based competitive advantage. The study further argued that the
advantage is sustainable, as most of the institutions that form its
basis have existed for many decades and are hardly exposed to
discontinued change.
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